Editor\u27s Note by O\u27Malley, Padraig
New England Journal of Public Policy 




University of Massachusetts Boston, padraig.omalley@umb.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp 
 Part of the Public Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
O'Malley, Padraig (2021) "Editor's Note," New England Journal of Public Policy: Vol. 33 : Iss. 2 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp/vol33/iss2/2 
This Editor's Notes is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in New England Journal of Public Policy by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at UMass 
Boston. For more information, please contact library.uasc@umb.edu. 





University of Massachusetts Boston  
 
Several of the articles in this issue of the New England Journal of Public Policy have a global 
focus, identifying threats to humanity’s future, some existential, that can be addressed only through 
unprecedented levels of international cooperation and new ways of thinking. But the global future 
is uncertain, whether because of conflict, extremism, the rise of nationalism, the retreat from 
democracy and its underlying value system, or moribund multilateral institutions and lack of 
leadership, much of which has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Rather than 
humanity coming together to face a common existential threat, countries retreated into their 
national silos and put their own national interests first. All the articles provide policy prescriptions 
that might either reverse present negative trends or identify new ways of thinking that the authors 
stress we must adopt if we are to navigate the world through the uncertain future.  
The most imminent challenge is climate change, requiring massive restructuring and 
reorientation of economies, huge changes in national attitudes and human behavior, sacrifice, and 
global consensus.  
The United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) met in Glasgow, Scotland, from 
October 31 to November 12, 2021, once again to discuss the trajectory of global warming, once 
again to pass resolutions calling on countries to urgently meet the emissions targets they agreed 
on in December 2015 in Paris, once again to have countries renew their pledges and announce new 
targets to hold warming at no more than 1.5˚C over preindustrial levels. For any hope to contain 
warming to 1.5˚C, greenhouse emissions will have to be halved by 2030, a mere eight years away, 
and reach net zero by 2050. The omens are not good.  
Since the first COP (Conference of the Parties) in 1995, called because of a sense of crisis, 
when there were 360 parts per million of carbon in the atmosphere, 80 points above the pre-
industrial level of 280, half of all the carbon ever released by humans since the dawn of humanity 
has been dumped into the atmosphere. The planet had already warmed by 0.6˚C since preindustrial 
times; today it is at 1.2˚ or 1.3˚C.1  
Since Paris, as one year after another has become the hottest on record—global carbon dioxide 
emissions were at their highest level ever in 2020, at 420 parts per million, 70 points above the 
350 parts per million estimated in the 1990s as the “safety” threshold to limit warming to less than 
1.5˚C, and too few countries met their emission targets, including the two most prominent climate 
polluters, the United States and China—there has been a nuanced change of emphasis. Whereas in 
Paris the goal was to keep the temperature “well below” 1.5˚C, the goal now is to limit warming 
by no more than 2.0˚C and even that goal is increasingly problematical because it calls for massive 
changes in the way we live and work, an almost total reliance on new energy sources, the closing 
down of the fossil fuel industry and a wholesale shift to electric cars, and a degree of global 
cooperation that does not exist in the present toxic mix of international relations.  
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According to the UN report released in the week before COP26, which UN Secretary- General 
António Guterres called “Code Red for humanity,” if current policies are pursued, the temperature 
will put the world on the path to 2.7˚C of warming by 2100. The potential range lies between 2.1˚C 
and 3.9˚C, that is, between the catastrophic and the apocalyptic.  
Unsurprising, therefore, that at COP26 there were dire warnings of the risk to human 
civilization unless warming is halted and in years to come reversed. The year 2021 has been 
catastrophic for the impact of global warming in countries as geographically distant as the United 
States and China, Turkey, Siberia, India, Germany, Nigeria, Uganda, and Greece, with fierce 
wildfires, blistering heat waves, crop-killing drought, intense precipitation, huge floods, hurricanes 
and typhoons of immense strength, tornadoes across the US Northwest flattening whole 
communities, all leaving in their wake death, economic and social devastation, climate refugees, 
and human tragedy. If COP26 does not result in a coordinated global response to warming, it is 
unclear what might. 
The United Nations has repeatedly called attention to the almost unimaginable consequences 
of rampant warming, the death knell for whole civilizations, perhaps for humanity itself, an 
outcome in some future time if feedback loops make warming self-reinforcing, impervious to what 
humanity might do to alter the outcome too unbearable to envisage, too distant in the future, and 
thus not easily discounted as being an imminent and immediate threat. We are not wired to deal 
with long-term threats, just those that are immediate or short term. Even now, many of the impacts 
of warming are still stored in the atmosphere. If all emissions were reduced to nothing overnight, 
these effects will be felt through 2050 at least.  
Pledges were made: country pledges to cut emissions by 50 percent by 2030, putting question 
marks along their credibility; a declaration to end deforestation by 2030; ninety countries, 
accounting for two-thirds of the global economy, to cut methane gas emissions by at least 30 
percent by the end of the decade; forty countries to phase out coal-fired power by 2040 but not 
among them the biggest coal polluters—China, India, the United States, and Australia. 
The United States “would aim” to cut greenhouse emissions by 50 to 52 percent over 2005 
levels by 2030 and to zero levels by 2050. Given the level of political polarization in the United 
States and the fact that one-third of the population continues to deny climate change, what 
transitioning from the oil and gas industries to wind and solar power and other renewables will 
involve and how the wholesale embrace of electric cars will be accomplished make these goals 
more aspirational than credible. In China and India, emissions will continue to rise through the 
twenties. In China, from peak emissions in 2030, the goal then will be to get to zero emissions by 
2060; India did not set any emissions goal. Many, especially young people, came away from 
Glasgow disheartened. It seemed to them that their elders still could not match their words with 
actions that reflect the massive scale of the problem: 2030 is half a lifetime away. The one statistic 
to make it away from the conference is the projection of the Climate Action Tracker that even if 
countries live up to all their pledges, the temperature of the earth will soar to 2.4˚C by 2100.2  
On this score, Sundeep Waslekar, in “Reinventing Multilateral Order,” argues that the 
outlook, at least in the short-to-medium term, is not optimistic. The multiple crises of our time—
the COVID-19 pandemic, an accelerating nuclear arms race, and climate warming—he points out, 
are severely aggravated by a breakdown of the multilateral order.  
By mid-2021, the COVID-19 pandemic had already infected two hundred million, killed four 
million across two hundred countries, brought the world economy to a standstill, disrupted global 
supply chains, and forced millions to live in isolation, tearing apart the fabric of society. Countries 
competed for HP59 masks, developed their vaccines and travel protocols, and side-lined the World 
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Health Organization. While rich countries hoarded their vaccines, poorer countries were forced to 
do with leftovers or a vastly insufficient number of donated vaccines and lacked the distribution 
infrastructure that would have allowed them to reach the bulk of their populations. By late 2021, 
only 2 percent of Africa had been vaccinated. The global situation  was slowly evolving, 
accentuating the divide between rich and poor, into vaccinated and unvaccinated countries, with 
restrictive protocols governing travel and accessibility. What should have been a wake-up call for 
humanity that its unpreparedness to respond in multilateral cooperation and global collaboration 
to the consequences of a sudden event—in this instance a global pandemic that threatens its 
survival not at some future date but in the here and now—underscored the dysfunctionality of 
international institutions, especially the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council. 
Instead, countries closed their borders and prioritized self-interest.  
Once again, a seemingly out-of-control nuclear arms race looms with the development of 
supersonic missiles that can travel several times the speed of sound and carry nuclear payloads, 
making the doctrine of nuclear deterrence obsolete. Russia has its Avangard that travels at twenty-
seven times the speed of sound, carries an ICBM, and determines its own flight path, making it 
not detectable by the United States’ missile shield; China has the DF-17 that travels five times the 
speed of sound; and the United States, playing catch-up, has tested a supersonic vehicle that can 
carry nuclear bombs. Without any treaty in place that might avert the threat of nuclear annihilation, 
humanity is at a crossroads: at present any event, even accidental, could trigger the use of these 
missiles once they become fully operational. There are no warning mechanisms in place, they 
evade radar defense shields, the impact is virtually instantaneous, and the targeted countries have 
minutes or less to respond. It could well be that humanity wipes out itself or a large portion of 
itself because of a simple accident. 
Waslekar makes his case for a new form of global governance on the grounds that existing 
multilateral institutions have become dysfunctional, too eroded to prevent catastrophic risks, 
including a military confrontation between superpowers. The weakening of multilateralism is due 
in part to the corrosive growth of hyper nationalism in many countries. The alternative is 
devastation or perhaps termination of the human race. 
In “The White Supremacist Penetration of Western Security Forces: The Wider Implications,” 
Kumar Ramakrishna examines the exponential growth of white Christian nationalism as an 
international phenomenon and the degree to which it has penetrated the security forces in different 
countries, especially Germany and the United States. Of the 650 individuals charged in connection 
with the January 6 assault on the US Capitol building, almost 1 in 10 served in the military. That 
only 7 percent of US adults are military veterans demonstrates starkly how overrepresented people 
with such a background were implicated in the violence that day. 
“The white supremist movement,” he writes, is “a complex, continually evolving, if 
fragmented, phenomenon.” Quoting from an article he wrote earlier, he goes on to describe it as 
“‘a bewildering amalgam of White nationalists, some White Christian evangelicals, racists, anti-
government militias, misogynists, anti-globalisers, and anti-vaxxers, amongst others,’ seeking to 
exploit the ‘global social and political upheaval’—including the current pandemic—to ‘promote 
intolerant ideas and at times inflict violence.’” Most attacks are lone wolf, carried out by 
individuals who use live streaming of their impending actions or post manifestos online before 
perpetrating their acts of violence. This online presence creates an international network where 
lone wolves in different countries take inspiration for their actions from one another, often 
perpetrating copycat attacks. The movement is leaderless but has major enablers and influencers, 
including institutional ones, such as Breitbart News and the Fox News network in the United 
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States, that give voice to prominent white nationalists. And though the movement lacks an 
organizational hierarchy, it is growing stronger, mostly with the interconnecting motif that the 
West is under an existential threat from Muslims, migrants, and others who do not share a white 
Christian identity—the great replacement theory, which finds its most fanatical adherents in 
Europe but also increasingly in the United States.  
In Europe the theory is simple: the white Christian population is shrinking and the population 
is aging, a situation that will not reverse itself. There is an acute labor shortage requiring 
immigration that comes mostly from Asia and Muslim countries in North Africa. The great 
replacement theory speaks for itself. Muslims and others, most conspicuously Jews, are 
supplanting white people; white Christian culture and core values are under attack from alien 
religions and a culture that espouses values that are antithetical to those of the West. In the United 
States, where demographic trends are following a similar pattern—a declining white population 
and a growing Hispanic population—the country will move from majority white to one of 
pluralities by the mid-2040s. In California, the country’s most populous state, New Mexico, Texas, 
Nevada, Maryland, and Hawaii this has already happened. The percentage of whites dropped from 
90 percent in 1950 to 60 percent in 2018 and will drop below 50 percent in the mid-2040s.3 
In recent years these replacement ideas have gradually entered the political mainstream. What 
were once peripheral extremist views, the province of mostly white nationalists, now find 
expression, sometimes subtlety, in mainstream political discourse, including that of the AfD party 
in Germany, Marine Le Pen and the right-wing pundit Eric Zemmour’s candidacy for the 
presidency in France, and Viktor Orban in Hungary. The rise of English nationalism was 
responsible for Brexit, the Leave vote mantra, “Take back control,” to foreshadow a Global Britain, 
a Singapore on the Thames.  
In the United States, the alt-right has found a footing in the Republican Party’s base. As 
Ramakrishna notes, quoting from an article in Time.com, during his announcement that he would 
run for office in 2016, Donald Trump declared that “Mexico is not our friend” and disparaged 
Mexican immigrants by saying that “they’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re 
rapists.” His repeated warnings during his presidency that caravans of migrants were trekking from 
Latin and Central America to the US border to invade the United States played into the fears of 
whites and found a huge audience. Trump, Ramakrishna writes, “framed migration as an evil, 
existential threat to white American Christian cultural identity.” In contrast, representatives of the 
Biden administration, in a Senate hearing, described “racially or ethnically motivated violent 
extremists, . . . specifically those who advocate for the superiority of the white race,” as the 
“greatest domestic threat facing the United States.”4 
Among the remedies Ramakrishna advocates is the construction of the German, American, 
and perhaps other Western national identities to transcend narrow culturalist understandings and 
strengthen shared creedal values. He quotes Francis Fukuyama: “a creedal nation is based not on 
any particular ethnicity, race, or religion but rather the common political principles of 
constitutionalism, the rule of law, democratic accountability, and equality.” Fukuyama asserts, for 
example, that the Protestant work ethic should no longer be seen as the sole preserve of “Anglo-
Protestant culture”—as what some conservative public intellectuals and, for that matter, more 
avowedly white supremacist ideologues might say. Instead, such an ethic has “become detached 
from its particular ethno-religious origins” and is today “the common property of all Americans.” 
Mohammed Sinan Siyech, in “An Introduction to Right-Wing Extremism in India,” also 
addresses the rise of right-wing extremism but in the context of India. Hindu nationalism, he writes, 
quoting from another source, “an ethno-national fundamentalist belief system with a religious 
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sheen that legitimizes the structural violence of Hindus . . . against Muslims, Dalits, and secular 
liberals,” is India’s right-wing extremism, which has gathered strength since the 1980s and is now 
the pervasive political ideology in the country.  
India, too, is slipping on the democracy scale and is curtailing religious freedom, particularly 
for Muslims. In its 2020 annual report, the United States Commission for International Religious 
Freedom called India “a country of particular concern,” noting that the legal systems there had 
“begun to disenfranchise non-Hindus in India.” Also, in 2020, Siyech observes, India’s rankings 
fell in the 2020 annual Varieties of Democracy report, which measures democratic ideals: “The 
report notes a steep decline in democratic freedom in India facilitated by the current government 
[of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party] and points out that the Hindu 
nationalist agenda is among the reasons for the decline.”  
The othering and demonization of Muslims, in particular, has been accompanied by violence, 
hate speech, and demonization on social media. Violence against Muslims, including lynching, are 
on the increase—with implicit tolerance on the part of Hindu leadership who for the most part 
remain silence when incidents of violence occur. Such is the extent of the othering of Muslims that 
it has, in echoes of the great replacement theory, given rise to its own variant—that the Hindu 
population will be overtaken by Muslims, “as expressed in the phrase Hindus khatre main hain.” 
The phenomenon that has been described as “majoritarian insecurities,” “the idea that a majority 
community can be destroyed by the minority,” Siyech writes, is not confined to India but finds an 
expression “in other countries of South Asia, such as Pakistan and Bangladesh.” In India it has 
facilitated a “further otherization of the minority and the justification of crimes committed in the 
name of protecting the Hindu community from the existential threat of Muslims.” 
Siyech also addresses the role of the caste system in perpetuating the dominance of the 
Brahmins, who account for 20 percent of the population. To preserve their position of dominance 
since independence, they played a large role in the promulgation of a “Hindu only national 
identity.” Rallying the lower castes around the threat of Islam and of Muslims destabilizing India, 
they insisted on the necessity of maintaining the caste system to thwart the Muslim threat. “The 
unwillingness of the current government to tackle right-wing extremism,” Siyech argues, “could 
facilitate the rise of fringe groups that will eventually turn against the government for being too 
soft.” 
Richard Caplan’s “Challenges for Multilateralism in a Pre-Post-COVID World” reiterates 
themes from Waslekar and Ramakrishna—the toxic impact of rising nationalisms and illiberalism 
among authoritarian regimes in once comfortably democratic countries. Noting that of 165 
countries surveyed by the Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EUI) Democracy Index for 2019, just 22 
were “full democracies”—the lowest number since the EUI was launched in 2006 and more than 
a third live under authoritarian regimes—Caplan addresses how these trends either individually or 
in combination undermine multilateralism, especially global bodies such as the United Nations 
and its ancillary agencies, and the European Union, with Brexit and the illiberal governments in 
Hungary and Poland. (According to a 2018 survey of ten European countries by the Pew Research 
Center, he notes, “an average of 62 percent of those surveyed said that the European Union ‘does 
not understand the needs of its citizens.’” It is faulted for its preoccupation with rules rather than 
the welfare of its citizens.)  
One idea propagated by UN Secretary-General Guterres that would give the global public a 
better understanding of the work of multilateral institutions and how it impacts their lives is 
“inclusive multilateralism,” a phrase he used in an address to the General Assembly in 2019. 
Caplan writes: “If multilateral institutions seem remote and out of touch with the public, [Guterres] 
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stated, then more should be done to include the public in the work of these organizations. That 
means ‘closer contacts with businesses, civil society, and other stakeholders.’” Caplan suggests 
that achieving this goal might involve the use of digital technologies that now “offer unprecedented 
opportunities for various constituencies to weigh in on a whole host of issues, as the pandemic has 
made clear.” He continues: “But to be effective these constituencies need to feel that their voices 
genuinely matter. The difficulty is that states are often reluctant to yield space to nonstate actors.”  
In “From Conflict to COVID: How Shared Experiences Shape Our World and How They 
Could Improve It,” Harvey Whitehouse provides a detailed account of the research being 
conducted by Oxford University’s Centre for the Study of Social Cohesion (CSSC) on identity 
fusion, the “visceral sense of oneness with the group.” Personal identity is completely sublimated 
to a group identity and the two become one. Carefully replicated studies of fusion in groups as 
widely diverse “as Melanesian cargo cults, revolutionary insurgents in Libya, football hooligans 
in Brazil, and Muslim fundamentalists in Indonesia, as well as populations that hadn’t really 
thought of themselves as groups before disaster struck, ranging from the random victims of 
terrorist attacks around the world to those affected by the COVID pandemic” have yielded similar 
conclusions. They show that shared suffering, whatever the cause, can lead to fusion and 
extraordinary acts of cooperation and self-sacrifice, a “social glue” that dissipates in the wake of 
civil wars: absent the conflict that gave meaning to the group and its purpose, fusion between 
personal and group shrinks. “If only policy decisions were more fully informed by the scientific 
research on shared experience and group bonding,” Whitehouse argues, “we could potentially 
harness social cohesion, in consensual ways, to heal divisions in society and motivate forms of 
cooperation essential to future peace and prosperity.”  
The motivators of fusion are primarily fear and love, but of the two love is the more powerful. 
“From the professional soldier who throws himself onto a grenade to protect his fellows to the 
suicide bombers of Al Qaeda, willingness to lay down one’s life for the group may be rooted more 
deeply in bonds with the in-group than by fear of any form of external inducement, threat, or 
coercion,” Whitehouse points out. He describes a growing body of research that suggests that the 
“relationship between fusion and pro-group action is mediated by a range of other factors, 
including the kinds of norms that the group valorizes.” CSSC research has shown that “fusion can 
be harnessed in a wide range of peaceful forms of prosocial action, from giving blood to supporting 
wildlife conservation.” It can also exacerbate divisions. Brexit and the Trump presidency are two 
prime examples. 
Fusion research also strongly suggests that efforts to tackle violent extremism—to 
deradicalize would-be terrorists—proceed from the misguided premise that “ideology is the main 
motivation behind violent self-sacrifice” and that “challenging people’s ideologies and group 
identities is the wrong place to start.” Whitehouse postulates instead “a more productive approach 
might be to focus on challenging the sharedness of self-shaping experiences,” which, “if done with 
the involvement of other in-group members, it is more likely to lead to lasting defusion.” 
Fusion research, Whitehouse concludes, has “profound implications” for public policy in 
meeting global challenges, among them global warming, too often seen as a problem posed by, 
and perhaps best solved by, the scientific community. The most important changes, however, 
“depend on global cohesion and collective action aimed at changing behavior.” 
Steve Killelea also addresses global challenges in “Peace Is the Answer for Our Post-
Pandemic World.” He advances the concept of “Positive Peace, combined with systems thinking 
as a new theory of change, a new way to conceptualize how societies function, and a new approach 
to solving the world’s most intractable problems.” Global threats that are putting humanity at risk 
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demand global solutions. But peace, he points out, is a prerequisite. “Without peace, it will not be 
possible to achieve the levels of trust, cooperation, and inclusiveness necessary to solve these 
challenges”; thus, the urgent need for new ways of conceptualizing problems and new ways of 
thinking.  
The Global Peace Index, a measure developed by the Australian Institute for Economics and 
Peace, which Killelea founded, shows a world that is less peaceful than it was ten years ago. In the 
decade leading up to 2020, eighty-one countries became less peaceful, while seventy-nine became 
more peaceful. In the past decade, incidents of civil unrest around the world doubled. But “even 
before the widespread demonstrations seen in 2020,” Killelea notes, “social and political instability 
had been on the rise in the West, with nearly seventy violent demonstrations recorded in 2019, 
compared with only nineteen in 2011.” Measures of societal resilience are falling in many 
advanced economies, a trend, he argues, that will continue because of their extended lockdowns 
due to COVID-19. Countries where the Positive Peace Index is high are better positioned to emerge 
from the COVID-induced global recession. The eight pillars of Positive Peace are “well-
functioning government; sound business environment; equitable distribution of resources; 
acceptance of the rights of others; good relations with neighbors; free flow of information; high 
levels of human capital; and a low level of corruption. It is these same factors that create resilient 
and adaptive societies that can pre-empt conflict and help societies channel disagreements 
productively.” The challenge is to harvest the socioeconomic behaviors and institutions that 
characterize the most peaceful countries and facilitate or retailor their replication in the less 
peaceful countries. 
“At the heart of a sustainable future,” Killelea concludes, “is the recognition that we are part 
of a system, not independent of it. Without a clear understanding of the systemic nature of peace 
and the factors that support it, it is impossible to determine what policies work best and what 
programs need to be implemented to support a more peaceful environment. Humanity needs new 
paradigms; the combination of Positive Peace and systems thinking provides a factual framework 
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